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Previously, it has been shown experimentally that the psychophysical law known as Piéron’s
Law holds for color intensity and that the size of the effect is additive with that of Stroop
condition (Stafford et al., 2011). According to the additive factors method (Donders, 1868–
1869/1969; Sternberg, 1998), additivity is assumed to indicate independent and discrete
processing stages. We present computational modeling work, using an existing Parallel
Distributed Processing model of the Stroop task (Cohen et al., 1990) and a standard model
of decision making (Ratcliff, 1978).This demonstrates that additive factors can be success-
fully accounted for by existing single stage models of the Stroop effect. Consequently, it
is not valid to infer either discrete stages or separate loci of effects from additive factors.
Further, our modeling work suggests that information binding may be a more important
architectural property for producing additive factors than discrete stages.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, much progress has been made on the neurological and
theoretical foundations of simple perceptual decisions (Gold and
Shadlen, 2001; Platt, 2002; Opris and Bruce, 2005). Key to debates
about the nature of decision making is the underlying architecture
of the neural and cognitive processes which implement decision
making (see, as an example disagreement Carpenter and Reddi,
2001; Ratcliff, 2001). The investigation of response times has been
key to progress in this area. A venerable tool of cognitive scientists
when interpreting response times, both in the study of decision
making and beyond, is the Additive Factors Method (Donders,
1868–1869/1969; Sternberg, 1998). In the current paper we show
that the assumptions of the Additive Factors Method are unten-
able, using as a worked example decision making in a speciﬁc
cognitive task. This work throws into contrast both models of
optimal decision making and a longer tradition of experiments
informed by the Additive Factors Method.
The particular task we focus on here is the Stroop task (Stroop,
1935) which affords a thoroughly investigated experimental para-
digm,with established computationalmodels of processingwithin
the task. Importantly for our current purposes, the Stroop task is
one in which both the directly perceptual and non-directly per-
ceptual (“cognitive”) elements of the stimulus must be reconciled
to produce a correct response. By manipulating the perceptual
and cognitive elements of the task independently we hope, in tan-
dem with the use of computational models and formal analysis, to
shed light on the issue of “detection” versus “decision” processing
(Reddi, 2001).
REACTION TIMES AND ARCHITECTURES OF DECISION MAKING
It is axiomatic to cognitive science that response or reaction times
(RTs) can reveal something about the underlying mechanism
of perception and choice (Luce, 1986). An example is Piéron’s
Law, which describes a consistent relationship between stimulus
intensity and simple reaction time (Piéron, 1952). Interestingly
this relationship has been shown to hold across different sensory
modalities and even for choice reaction times (Luce,1986; Pins and
Bonnet, 1996). Previously, we have suggested that Piéron’s Law
emerges inevitability from rise-to-threshold decision processes
(Stafford and Gurney, 2004).
The Stroop effect is a paradigmatic response conﬂict task
(Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991; MacLeod and MacDonald, 2000),
in which participants are asked to name the color of words, words
which may themselves spell out the names of colors. Thus, the
(distracting) word-aspect of a stimulus can be conﬂicting, con-
gruent, or neutral with respect to the (attended-to) color-aspect.
For example, when green ink spells out the word “RED” there is
heightened response conﬂict, which is reﬂected in slowed reaction
times and a raised error rate. We have used a Stroop task with
colors of varying saturation levels to show that Piéron’s Law holds
under conditions of response conﬂict, and that this effect does not
interact with the Stroop conﬂict condition (Stafford et al., 2011).
This is shown in Figure 1.
THE ADDITIVE FACTORS METHOD
The results shown in Figure 1 have an obvious interpretation
under what is known as the Additive Factors Method (AFM;Stern-
berg, 1969, 1998). According to the assumptions of the AFM,
independent components – “stages” – of decision making are
revealed by the analysis of how different factors affect reaction
times. The analysis of reaction times to inform consideration of
the stages involved in decision making is not new to psychological
theory (Donders, 1868–1869/1969). By this analysis, if manipula-
tion of one factor affects RTs independently of the manipulation
of another factor, that is if their effects are additive, then it is
concluded that the two factors affect different stages of decision
making. Thus theAFMprovides away of both uncoveringwhether
different factors have the same locus of inﬂuence and of inferring a
minimum number of independent loci that must be involved dur-
ing during decision making. The application of this method has
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FIGURE 1 | Mean reaction times for different stimulus color saturations in all three Stroop conditions. SE bars shown (n=20). Data from experiment 1
of Stafford et al. (2011).
produced consistent support for the existence of separate stages
in decision making, particularly the independence of stimulus
processing and response selection (Stoffels, 1996; van den Wilden-
berg and van der Molen, 2004). Indeed, one reviewer felt able to
comment“Most research onAFMshows consistent and robust evi-
dence in favor of seven successive processing stages in traditional
choice reactions” (Sanders, 1990, p.123). Although this quotation
may mark a high water mark of the AFM, it is still possible to see
this inference from additive factors to discrete processing stages
being made in more recent papers on decision making (e.g., Pins
and Bonnet, 1996;Woodman et al., 2008). The ﬁndings of research
in the AFM tradition stand in contrast to strong theoretical argu-
ments that an informationally optimal decision making process
must combine all the evidence pertaining to a decision into a
single term (Gold and Shadlen, 2002; Bogacz et al., 2006).
It is important to be aware, however, that the AFM method
can only point to the functional architecture of choice reactions
not the implementational architecture (Marr, 1982). The corre-
spondence between these two levels of description is by no means
clear (e.g., Rumelhart and McClelland, 1985). For example, a deci-
sion making process which occurred over multiple architectural
stages, optimally combining the evidence for all aspects of a deci-
sion could be modeled by a decision process with a single “weight
of evidence” term (and hence would have no additive factors, and
so would be – in terms of the additive factors method – a “single
stage” processing model).
The AFM assumes discrete, serially connected, modules.
Detailed modeling of how choice processes might produce deci-
sion times casts doubt on the validity of both this assumption
and the inference from additivity of factors to discrete process-
ing stages. Thomas (2006) shows that “additive factors” mod-
els can predict interaction of factors once reasonable assump-
tions about the representation of stimuli within standard deci-
sion models are included. In counter-point to this the Parallel
Distributed Processing (PDP) framework for understanding cog-
nition is founded on an explicit rejection of stage models of
processing, with information being continuously available and
interactively processed across multiple locations (Rumelhart et al.,
1986a). McClelland (1979) showed that such a PDP “continuous
processing” model could produce results which were consistent
with the AFM, despite the lack of the discrete serial modules that
the AFM is usually assumed to imply.
As well as these difﬁculties in making strong inferences
from additive factors to underlying processing architectures (and
vice versa), the distinction between continuous and discrete archi-
tectures is far from absolute. In two important reviews Miller
(1990) and Sanders (1990) both note that further assumptions
are required to constrain the models; assumptions on such
issues as whether the internal codes used by any putative stages
are continuous or discrete, whether the transformation between
codes is continuous or discrete and whether the transmission of
these codes between stages is continuous (ongoing) or discrete
(instantaneous).
In light of these distinctions it is clear that neither analysis nor
experiments alone will resolve the controversy over the number of
stages of processes required in models of simple decision making
(Carpenter and Reddi, 2001; Ratcliff, 2001). Our approach here is
to use both the analytic approach of the AFM and the synthetic
approach of model building within a PDP framework to inform
an interpretation of new experimental data. This accords well with
a review which concluded that because both discrete stage and
continuous processing models can, with the right parameteriza-
tion, mimic the results associated with the other it is vital to link
theory and experiment using an explicit model of the particu-
lar task (Townsend and Wenger, 2004). Our investigation begins
with the empirical data previously discovered and investigates how
an existing model of the Stroop might account for our results
involving manipulation of color intensity.
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MODELING ADDITIVE FACTORS IN THE STROOP TASK WITH
VARIABLE COLOR INTENSITY
Although a pattern of additive factors in the experimental data
suggests discrete processing stages, it is appropriate to ask if exist-
ing, continuous processing – i.e. “single stage” – models of the
Stroop task can ﬁt the data. We show that they can.
MODEL OUTLINE
Our starting point is the Cohen et al. (1990) model of the Stroop
task. This is a model in the Parallel Distributed Processing tradi-
tion, in that it primarily consists of a number of identical units,
which represent different concepts (Rumelhart et al., 1986b). Each
unit has an associated activity, which inﬂuences the activity of
those other units it is connected to. In Cohen et al.’s (1990) paper
the model is trained to perform word and color reading using back
propagation (Rumelhart et al., 1986a). Here, however, we do not
consider learning and the impact of different training regimes. The
essence of the model is that it performs stimulus-response transla-
tion, reconciling the word and color information in the stimulus,
according to the attentional demands of the task instructions
(“Respond based on the ink color, ignore the word"). The weight-
ing of these factors and their combination, drives inputs into the
responsemechanism,which is that component of themodel which
signals the selected response. It does this after a certain amount
of evidence, in terms of combined activity from upstream units
in the model, has been accumulated. The mechanism of evidence
accumulation is based on the drift diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978;
Ratcliff andMcKoon,2008). For a detailed discussionof thismodel
of the Stroop task and the response mechanism see Stafford and
Gurney (2004, 2007).
We take it as the starting point for our present investigation
because it performs stimulus-response translation in arguably
the simplest generic way within a parallel distributed process-
ing framework. Although there are a number of other models
of Stroop processing, it is beyond the scope of the current work
to comprehensively investigate them and contrast them under the
same manipulations as we present here.
This model is a continuous processing model. Activity in all
parts of the model is continuously updated as the effect of the
change in inputs (representing stimulus presentation) propagates
through. In this respect, then, it is considered a “single stage”
model; although it may have many architectural stages, they are a
functional unit, with all components running simultaneously and
passing information simultaneously and without delay to each
other.
In the following sections we describe how the bare minimum
of adjustments are made to this basic model to accommodate (a)
the manipulation of stimulus intensity (as done experimentally in
Stafford et al., 2011), and (b) the investigation of issues of stimulus
binding and continuous vs. discrete stage models. For full details
of the function of the model in all simulations reported here the
reader is encouraged to inspect the source code which is provided
in the supplementary material.
EXTENDING CONTINUOUS PROCESSING MODELS OF THE STROOP
TASK
In the original model the word and color information is
represented by 0 or 1 values on the input layer (so that the if
the stimulus color, say, was red, the input unit for “red” would be
clamped at 1 and the input unit for “green” would be clamped
at 0). To simulate the present experiment intermediate intensity
values between 0 and 1 were used for this input encoding, with
both the color and the word inputs values clamped at the same
intermediate values, namely 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, or 1.0. This reﬂects
the corresponding variation in the strength of the input represen-
tation with varying color saturation. Because both the word and
color inputs to themodel begin at the same time and have identical
values we denote this the “single stage model with locked inputs.”
The information ﬂow for this simulation, and the one immediately
following, is show in Figure 2.
Figure 3 shows the results of the model. The match to the
pattern of the experimental data is close. Piéron’s Law holds for
all Stroop conditions and the interference and facilitation effects
are constant across saturation conditions (see Table 1). In the
original Cohen model, model reaction times are converted from
model time-steps to simulated milliseconds using linear regres-
sion from the model reaction times to the empirical reaction times
(Cohen et al., 1990, p.340).Obviously this approach is useful if we
wish to compare model results with empirical data. In the current
paper we are concerned with comparing between models. The lin-
ear regression, whilst producing plausible reaction times in terms
of simulated milliseconds would not change the “shape” of the
model results (in graphical terms, merely “distorting” the scale).
Because of this we present here the model reaction times untrans-
formed and leave the axis without value labels (the absolute values,
in model time-steps are essentially arbitrary). The simulations
should be judged according to the relative values of the reaction
times – i.e. on whether the factors interact or not – and this judg-
ment can be made without transforming the model reaction times
into simulated milliseconds.
The complementary simulation to this one is to use the same
“single stage” architecture but to vary the color and word intensity
values independently (i.e. they are “unlocked”). Namely, the word
intensity value is held at 1 (as in the original Cohen et al., 1990
simulation) and the color intensity value only is varied. The results
of this simulation are shown in Figure 4.
Note that for the single stage model with unlocked inputs the
result for the conﬂict condition at the lowest color intensity is not
shown. This is because at this point the model stops predicting the
FIGURE 2 | Information flow in the basic model.The Decision stage
consists of the Cohen et al. (1990) model of Stroop processing. The
continuous stage simulations reported here use this architecture, merely
with modiﬁcations to the input encoding.
www.frontiersin.org November 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 287 | 3
Stafford and Gurney AFM and models of Stroop conﬂict
FIGURE 3 | Single stage model with locked inputs: simulated reaction times for the standard Stroop task across a range of color intensities.
Table 1 | Fit of Piéron’s law against simulation data for single stage
model with locked inputs.
Stroop condition Correlation coefficient β
Control 1.00* 1.01
Conﬂict 1.00* 1.40
Congruent 1.00* 0.90
*Signiﬁcant p<0.0001.
Table 2 | Fit of Piéron’s law against simulation data single stage model
with unlocked inputs.
Stroop condition Correlation β
Control 1.00* 1.01
Conﬂict 1.00* 5.46
Congruent 1.00* 0.18
*Signiﬁcant p<0.0001.
correct response, and hence, although the model does produce a
reaction time it is not comparable with the other results since it
is for the wrong response. This single data point was also omitted
from the analysis presented in Table 2.
As can be seen from the graph, and conﬁrmed by the ﬁts to
Piéron’s Law functions shown in Table 2, this simulation manifests
multiplicative rather than additive factors. Although it is possible
to ﬁt a Pièron’s Law function to the data from each of the Stroop
conditions, the β values of these functions are very different. This
is indicative of the difference in slopes of the functions. This pat-
tern of reaction times would be interpreted under the AFM as
interactive rather than additive factors.
FIGURE 4 | Single stage model with unlocked inputs: simulated
reaction times for the standard Stroop task across a range of color
intensities. Data point omitted where model provides the incorrect
response (see text).
Prima facie these results are unsatisfactory, since the locking of
inputs values would appear to be an ad hoc assumption. However,
our simulation results with discrete two stage models, introduced
below, call into question the unreasonableness of assuming locked
input encodings. Before we move on to consider these additional
simulations, note that the locked or unlocked nature of word
and color inputs changes the outputs of this single stage model
from appearing additive to appearing interactive. The logic of the
AFM asks us to infer discrete stages from additive factors, yet these
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simulation results demonstrate that the manifestation of additive
factors can depend entirely on changes to the input encoding, not
upon the nature of the underlying processing architecture.
DISCRETE STAGE MODELS OF STROOP PROCESSING
Results from simulations involving the single stage (i.e. continuous
processing) Cohen model of Stroop processing are ambiguous, so
it behooves us to investigate how a model with two, discrete, stages
behaves under the same manipulation of inputs.
A two stage, discrete processing, variant of the standard Cohen
model is constructed by adding a preliminary “detection” stage.
This stage delays inputs to the second stage, the original Cohen
model as described above,until a critical amount of stimulus infor-
mation has accumulated. Once this detection stage is completed
the original inputs – i.e., either 1 (“present”) or 0 (“absent”) – are
activated and processing continues in the Cohen model as normal.
The information ﬂow in this new architecture is shown in Figure 5.
The inﬂuenceof color saturation is incorporatedbyproviding con-
tinuously valued inputs to the detection stage only. The detection
FIGURE 5 | Information flow in the two stage models.The Detection
stage consists of rise-to-threshold evidence accumulator, based on Ratcliff
(1978).
stage is a rise-to-threshold process where the time-to-completion
is deﬁned by thresh/intensity where, in this case, thresh= 10 and
intensity reﬂects the stimulus intensity (i.e. color saturation here)
and is taken as the values 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, or 1.0. This stage is based
on evidence accumulation models of perceptual decision making
(Ratcliff, 1978; Usher and McClelland, 2001; Bogacz et al., 2006).
Because the detection stage delays the activation of both word and
color inputs to the Stroop processing component of the model
(the Cohen model) we denote that this model has “locked inputs.”
The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 6. As
expected, it is possible to generate simulated reaction time data
which qualitatively matches the experimental data by adding an
discrete detection stage to the existing Cohen model of Stroop
processing.
Note that, as in the experimental data, the interference effect is
larger than the facilitation effect across all stimulus intensity val-
ues, and that both effects are consistent across all stimulus intensity
values. Fits of the curves to Piéron’s Law (Table 3) show both
strong matches and similar exponents (β) across conditions, as in
the experimental data.
This is not a surprising result, since the simulation is an imple-
mentation of the architecture which inspired the logic of theAFM.
The AFM infers discrete stages from additive factors, and this
is based on the (correct) belief that if two experimental factors
independently affect two separate processing stages then they will
generate a pattern of additive factors in the response times. Note,
however, that this correct belief is not logically sufﬁcient to justify
the inference of discrete stages fromadditive factors in the response
times.
The ﬁnal simulation of this paper asks if models with discrete
processing stages necessarily produce additive factors. Recall that
in the single stage models the input encoding could be “locked”or
FIGURE 6 |Two stage model with locked inputs: simulated reaction times for the standard Stroop task across a range of color intensities.
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“unlocked,” these terms indicating whether inputs signifying word
and color information had the same strength and onset timings.
For the two stage model it is also possible have the input encod-
ing as locked or unlocked. For locked inputs (i.e. as shown in
the simulation immediately preceding), the inputs to the Cohen
model are delayed until a preceding “sensory detection” stage is
completed. To perform the ﬁnal, complement, simulation – the
two stage model with unlocked inputs – this means that both the
word and color inputs to the Stroop processing component of the
model are separately controlled by independent rise-to-threshold
based “detection” processes, as described above. The color inputs
vary, as before, and the word input is always 1. Because of this
arrangement, in the unlocked input encoding conditions it is pos-
sible for the second stage to begin computing a response before
it has received information about both aspects of the stimulus.
Note that in accord with the assumptions of the AFM, the stim-
ulus intensity only affects processing in the ﬁrst stage, and the
Stroop condition only affects processing in the second stage. The
results are shown in Figure 7. Correlations and the β values from
ﬁtting Pièron’s curves to these simulated reaction times are shown
in Table 4.
It is not clear that the exponents of the curves from ﬁtting
Pièron’s Law to the simulation results are consistent. In order to
more clearly inspect this issue we calculated the ratio of the inter-
ference effect at each saturation level against the interference effect
at the highest saturation level (i.e. the interference effect in the nor-
mal Stroop condition). This is shown in Figure 8 with the ratios
for the one and two stagemodels with locked inputs also shown for
comparison. This analysis should make it clear that although both
the one and two stage models with locked inputs have consistent
interference effects (indicative of additivity of factors), the models
with unlocked inputs, both one and two stage, have variable inter-
ference effects, which is indicative of an interaction of factors. The
same conclusions can be reached by analyzing facilitation effects
(not shown here).
DISCUSSION OF MODELING
The present results provide a speciﬁc instance (the ﬁrst simula-
tion) of the claim that continuous processing models can mimic
discrete processing models (McClelland, 1979). This weakens our
conﬁdence that inference about the underlying architecture can
be made from data patterns consistent with factor additivity. The
second simulation behaves in-line with the assumptions of the
AFM – it is a single stage model and generates outputs consistent
with having only a single stage, i.e. multiplicative factors. Note,
Table 3 | Fit of Piéron’s law against simulation data for two stage
model with locked inputs.
Stroop condition Correlation coefficient β
Control 1.00* 1.00
Conﬂict 1.00* 1.00
Congruent 1.00* 1.00
*Signiﬁcant p<0.0001.
however, that the architecture of both the ﬁrst and second sim-
ulations is identical, the only change is to the independence of
the input encoding. Simulations involving architectures with two
clearly discrete stages of processing show that such architectures
can produce additive factors, as has been traditionally assumed,
FIGURE 7 | Simulation data for two stage model with unlocked inputs.
Table 4 | Fit of Piéron’s law against simulation data for both two stage
and one stage models with unlocked inputs.
Stroop condition Correlation β
Control 1.00* 0.89
Conﬂict 1.00* 1.00
Congruent 1.00* 1.05
*Signiﬁcant p<0.0001.
FIGURE 8 | Interference ratios for the four simulations.
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but that this is not necessarily so (the fourth simulation). These
results show that no simple inference from factor additivity, or its
absence, to underlying architecture is possible.
Overall, the binding of color andword information during pro-
cessing – which we have called locking of inputs – determines
the manifestation of additive factors irrespective of processing
architecture. This suggests that, vis-à-vis the experimental data
(Stafford et al., 2011), the intensity at which word information is
represented is affected by the intensity of color saturation. In other
words, although it might at ﬁrst appear unreasonable to assume
that extent of color saturation affects how word information is
represented by participants, modeling of the task with both estab-
lished and modiﬁed models of Stroop processing suggests that
this may indeed be occurring. Obviously further, direct, exper-
imental tests are required to conﬁrm this. For the moment we
may regard this locking of inputs as a prediction from the model-
ing work which may, at some future point, be veriﬁed or falsiﬁed
(rather than, say, as an assumption of the models that needs to be
justiﬁed). For the current work the “locking” of inputs has a pre-
cise meaning - that the intensity values representing the word and
color information are the same and, in the case of the discrete stage
model, arrive at the “decision” stage of the model at the same time.
We are aware that there is a wider debate regarding the “binding
problem,” its exact nature and possible solutions, but do not wish
to make strong claims about this issue here. In our models bind-
ing is declare to occur – there is no explicit mechanism within the
models responsible for making this happen. Any mechanism that
could bind together the representations of word and color intensity
would be part of the wider operation of those phenomena known
as “attention.” To postulate the binding of inputs together in this
sense does not seem such an unreasonable assumption given the
important role attention plays in the generating the Stroop Effect
(Besner et al., 1997; MacLeod and MacDonald, 2000).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
CONSEQUENCES FOR MODELS OF DECISION MAKING
We have argued elsewhere (Stafford et al., 2011) that the empiri-
cal results treated here cannot be accounted for by a simple (one
stage) response mechanism using a common metric. These mod-
els extend and qualify this conclusion by showing that a single
stage model, in the sense of “single stage” used throughout this
paper, can account for the additive factors in the empirical results.
The Cohen model replicates the empirical data because the stim-
ulus processing “front-end” transforms the stimulus information
so that the inputs to the response mechanism produce consistent
interference and facilitation at each level of color saturation, even
though the absolute reaction times vary according to Piéron’s Law.
This model of Stroop processing (the ﬁrst simulation) matches
the pattern of empirical data, just as the two stage model with
discrete processing of detection and decision stages does (the
fourth simulation). This is an illustration of the phenomenon
of model-mimicry (Townsend and Wenger, 2004) and more gen-
erally of the dangers of judging models solely by the goodness
of ﬁt to data (Roberts and Pashler, 2000). The strong implica-
tion, discussed further below, is that it is not possible to infer
discrete processing stages from the appearance of additive factors
in reaction time data.
Does it matter that the empirical data can be ﬁtted with two
fundamentally different kinds of model? It is a legitimate strategy
of model development to restrict oneself to data modeling, in the
sense of trying to ﬁt outcome characteristics such as reaction time
and error rates without reference to the plausibility of the internal
structure of the models. From this perspective, both the single
and two stage models are as good as each other. However data ﬁt-
ting is not the sole criterion for model development (Roberts and
Pashler, 2000; Pitt and Myung, 2002). Indeed debates about inter-
nal structure seem unavoidable once an abstract model developed
using data ﬁtting is applied to biological data (as inRatcliff et al.,
2003) or, conversely, biological data or arguments are recruited to
help discriminate between such models (Reddi, 2001). To guide
this debate, it is important to address explicitly which level(s) a
model is designed to work at. A data-descriptive model should be
judgeddifferently fromone that is supposed to represent theneural
machinery which implements decision making. This “abstract
mechanistic” level of description (Gurney, 2007) is the one at
which, implicitly, the PDP models of Stroop processing, including
the current models, are couched. Multiple-loci models of decision
making such as these represent a problem for optimality analysis,
because optimal decision making requires that all factors affect-
ing the decision be weighed against each other, for if they are not
then how can an optimal response be calculated? This requirement
means that single stage models of decision making will be useful
at the data-descriptive level of analysis for deﬁning optimality, but
multi-stage models will be required to account for experimental
situations where decision making departs from optimality.
The models presented here suggest that the simple decision
making models developed to account for simple perceptual deci-
sions (e.g., the Diffusion Model of Ratcliff, 1978), and as reﬁned
by the optimality analysis of Bogacz et al. (2006), cannot alone be a
complete model of decision making. Without assumptions about
other elements of perception and action selection, such as included
in these models, simple response mechanisms are insufﬁcient to
account for empirical data once the scope of decision making
moves beyond the “simple perceptual” and onto even marginally
more complex cases. Elsewhere we have argued that such mod-
els are also inadequate for performing adaptive action selection
(Stafford and Gurney, 2007).
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ADDITIVE FACTORS MODEL
It has been shown theoretically that models with discrete stages
can mimic an interaction of factors (Thomas, 2006), and that
continuous processing models can also mimic additive factors
(McClelland, 1979). Here we show this with a concrete exam-
ple from an existing domain of active research. These results show
that without detailed additional assumptions any inference from
RTs to underlying processing architecture is untenable (as sug-
gested by Townsend andWenger, 2004). Miller (1990) and Sanders
(1990) both attempt to outline those speciﬁc additional assump-
tions which would deﬁne the senses in which models have discrete
stages – the code used can be continuous (as in our case, values
between 0 and 1) or discrete, as can the transformation of the
code in any particular stage between the input and output, and
the transmission of that code to the next stage. Speciﬁcation of
these additional constraints is necessary, they argue, in order to
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make ﬁrm predictions from models. We would go further and
argue that numerous and additional speciﬁcations may be needed.
In our case the difference between locked and unlocked input
representations turns out to be crucial. It is unclear which model
elementsmaymake a prima facie discrete stage architecture behave
as a continuous processing architecture, or vice versa, with respect
to additive factors. This does not just complicate the distinction
but makes it, we argue, irrelevant as far as the presence or absence
of additive factors goes. It is not, contra the AFM, possible to infer
discrete processing stages from the appearance of additive factors.
Nor is it possible to infer separate loci of effects for the different
factors. The ﬁrst simulation presented here shows additive effects
for the color intensity and Stroop condition factors, but the com-
putation of both of these factors happened simultaneously and in
parallel within the same model.
The current work also shows how data and models from a
speciﬁc decision making task can be co-opted to inform our
understanding. Although we have conﬁrmed, in a speciﬁc domain,
previous claims that no strong inference from RTs to architecture
is possible, we have also shown that the idea of processing stages
and common metrics can inform modeling investigations so as to
reveal surprising new results, in this case the ﬁnding that repli-
cating the empirical data requires that the information from the
separate Stroop dimensions be tethered in intensity.
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